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Abstract: Minimum unit pricing of alcohol has been proposed as a more effective 
policy for reducing alcohol-related harms than general taxation. Growing 
international evidence points to its effectiveness in targeting high risk drinkers, but 
concerns about the impact on low risk drinkers and those on low incomes remain. 
This paper uniquely models the potential effect on both low risk and low income 
purchasers in a Scottish subsample of UK panel data from introducing a minimum 
unit price and addresses the impact of missing income data on the results. Weekly 
household purchases of cheap off-sales alcohol from Kantar Worldpanel (2008-
2010) are analysed using Hausman-Taylor, Tobit and OLS models. Explanatory 
variables include economic and demographic characteristics of the households, 
average alcohol purchasing level for all off-sales alcohol, and characteristics of 
alcohol products purchased. The number of cheap alcohol units purchased are 
predicted by income group and purchasing level. Results indicate that the amount 
of cheap alcohol purchased is positively associated with the average purchasing 
level for all off-sales alcohol. Lower occupational group is associated with 
purchasing more units of cheap alcohol. Type of alcohol and purchasing alcohol on 
promotion are also highly significant. Predicted quantities of cheap alcohol 
purchased are not higher for the low-income group. Households in the top decile of 
alcohol purchasing level are predicted to purchase between 18 units of cheap alcohol 
weekly (low income) and 24 units (intermediate income). There was no evidence of 
bias due to missing income data. Minimum unit pricing for alcohol will have most 
impact on households purchasing the most alcohol, at all income levels. Restrictions 
on promotions should be considered as these are also associated with increased 
purchasing of cheap alcohol.  
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1 Introduction 
The relationships between alcohol prices, level of alcohol consumption and alcohol-related 
harms are well established (Chaloupka et al., 2002, Academy of Medical Sciences 2004, 
Wagenaar et al., 2009, Wagenaar et al., 2010, Elder et al., 2010, Giesbrecht et al., 2016). 
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Raising prices is recognised as an effective and cost-effective policy for addressing alcohol 
misuse (Chaloupka et al., 2002, Anderson et al., 2009, Wagenaar et al., 2009, Wagenaar et 
al., 2010, Elder et al., 2010). The mechanism for achieving price increases has come under 
increasing scrutiny, with minimum unit pricing (MUP) for alcohol proposed as a potentially 
more effective policy than increases in taxation (Gillan and Macnaughton, 2007, Scottish 
Government, 2012).  
Modelling of Swedish data (Gruenewald et al., 2006)  has shown that price increases 
for the lowest cost alcohol produces greater reductions in purchasing that an equivalent 
increase applied to all alcohol. Heavier drinkers might respond to any general price increase 
due to taxation by ‘trading down’ and purchasing cheaper alternative alcohol products 
(Hobday et al., 2016). Evidence for the effectiveness of MUP has accumulated, with recent 
research relating to reduction in alcohol consumption (Stockwell et al., 2012a, Sharma et 
al., 2014, Holmes et al., 2014) and alcohol-related harms (Stockwell et al., 2012a, Stockwell 
et al., 2017).  
Although taxation could be efficient in increasing prices and reducing alcohol 
consumption, MUP circumvents retailers’ ability to absorb tax increases on lower priced 
products (Ally et al., 2014). However, policy makers remain concerned that targeting cheap 
alcohol may penalise low risk drinkers, with UK Government ministers not convinced that 
MUP would “reduce problem drinking without penalising all those who drink responsibly” 
(Home Office, 2013). This was despite studies which suggest that low risk drinkers are least 
likely to be affected, given their relatively low alcohol consumption and tendency not to 
purchase the type of products targeted by MUP (Hunt et al., 2011, Black et al., 2011, 
Crawford et al., 2012). Household purchasing of alcohol at levels consistent with low 
alcohol consumption is associated with a lower predicted probability of purchasing cheap 
alcohol (Ludbrook et al., 2012). This latter finding is based on records of alcohol purchasing 
over a two-week period from the UK Expenditure and Food Survey. These data may under-
represent the number of households purchasing alcohol when compared with data collected 
over a longer period. More recent studies also support the view that MUP has least impact 
on low risk drinkers (Sharma et al., 2014, Holmes et al., 2014).  
Policy makers could also be concerned if MUP disproportionately affected low 
income groups, but research again suggests that MUP is only likely to impact people on low 
incomes if their alcohol consumption is excessive (Crawford et al., 2012, Ludbrook et al,. 
2012, Holmes et al., 2014). Only one report has suggested that the least well-off might face 
a higher burden (Leicester, 2011); this was based on estimating the impact of MUP as a 
percentage of food budgets, assuming that consumers did not change their purchasing 
behaviour. All other studies have accounted for the reduction in consumption or purchasing 
induced by a price increase.  
Most studies have used cross-sectional data, providing only a snapshot of consumer 
behaviour. This may overestimate the number of people not buying alcohol at all if they do 
not buy regularly and this is not observed in the survey period. Similarly, heavy purchasing 
may be overestimated if consumers are observed stockpiling alcohol which they consume 
over a longer period. Longitudinal (panel) data overcomes these issues to some extent by 
observing purchasing behaviour over a longer period and across the same individuals. Two 
studies have used panel data from household scanner data (Leicester, 2011, Sharma et al., 
2014). Leicester (2011) does not model any changes in consumption, even though this is the 
most likely response by consumers, and income values were missing for more than 20% of 
the households in the panel with no discussion of how this might impact on the results. 
Sharma et al. (2014) found that impact was small on lower level purchasers, but do not 
report results by income. The study by Holmes et al. (2014) created a pseudo-panel from 
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multiple cross-section observations using self-reported alcohol consumption, which avoids 
the need to aggregate across time. 
This paper aims to identify the impact of a MUP for alcohol on both low risk and 
low income purchasers in Scotland. It further contributes to the debate by identifying the 
type of households which will be most affected by the introduction of MUP, in terms of 
level of off-sales alcohol units purchased per adult in the household and income groups. 
This is the first paper to address both issues simultaneously using panel data to overcome 
concerns about the use of cross-section data. The analysis is based on the purchasing 
behaviour of households over an extended period (up to three years) which enables a better 
representation of typical purchasing patterns. The issue of missing income data, which has 
been a feature of household scanner data, is also addressed. The results confirm that 
purchasing cheap alcohol is most related to purchasing relatively higher quantities of 
alcohol, across all household decile. This is both in terms of the probability of purchasing 
cheap alcohol and the amount of cheap alcohol purchased. The exclusion of households with 
missing income data does not appear to bias these results.  
2 Data and variables 
Data were obtained from the market research company, Kantar Worldpanel (KWP) 
database; a panel of approximately 25,000 UK households recruited using stratified 
sampling methods partly based on UK Census returns to achieve national representation. 
Participants are rewarded for their time in the panel with high-street vouchers. Regular 
compliance and quality control checks are undertaken. A subset of 3076 Scottish households 
was used; 2185 joined the panel before the start of the first study week, the remainder joined 
over the three years. The data covers three years (2008-2010) or 156 weeks. Households 
were in the panel for an average of 117 weeks (range 1 to 156). At least one purchase of an 
alcohol product was made by 2671 households (87%); 405 households had no record of 
alcohol purchase.     
Households recruited by KWP are provided with a handheld scanner to record daily 
purchases made by all members of the household for items taken home for consumption, by 
scanning the product’s barcode and uploading the information using a PC. Households 
provide till receipts as a means of providing price information. Since only items purchased 
and taken home are recorded, only off-trade alcohol is included; i.e. alcohol bought in 
supermarkets or other shops for consumption off the premises. Off-trade sales of alcohol 
accounted for between 66% (2008) and 69% (2010) of total alcohol sales by volume in 
Scotland (NHS Health Scotland, 2014a) and are the focus of MUP legislation. Household 
characteristics including income, occupation, age and household composition were also 
recorded in Kantar database. Only one observation per household was available for each 
demographic variable.   
Alcohol purchases were recorded daily. A detailed product description identified the 
type and quantity of alcohol, amount spent, and whether the purchases were on promotion. 
Volume was combined with alcoholic strength to calculate units of alcohol (1 unit = 10 ml 
pure alcohol). For many products, the alcohol by volume (ABV) was in the product 
description. Where no ABV was identifiable, standard ABV values were used (e.g. 40% for 
whisky). Price per unit of alcohol was calculated for each purchase using the amount spent 
and adjusted to 2011 values, using the Consumer Price Index (CPI) (Office for National 
Statistics, 2012). The dependent variable is the number of cheap alcohol units purchased 
weekly, defined as less than £0.50 ($0.62, € 0.58) per unit, which corresponds to the 
threshold value the Scottish government selected for their legislation and is to be 
implemented in May 2018.  
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The data were prepared for panel analysis by aggregating daily records to weekly 
purchases, creating a unique time identifier (week number). This resulted in a usable number 
of 75,286 weeks of alcohol purchases. Excluding the 405 households with no record of 
alcohol purchases, the data comprised 257,735 weeks of grocery purchases of which 75,286 
weeks (29%) had alcohol purchases recorded and 182,449 weeks had zero alcohol 
purchases. Allowing for missing data among different demographic variables, 161,147 
observations were available for analysis. Most of the missing data was due to household 
income not being recorded for 541 households. The effect of missing data on the results was 
explored, as described in section 4.    
A variable was created to categorise households according to the average amount of 
off-sales alcohol purchased. The household average number of units of alcohol purchased 
per adult per week was grouped into deciles. This value was estimated using all weeks with 
grocery purchase records, including those weeks with no alcohol purchase. This allows for 
alcohol not being consumed in the same week it was purchased. However, the extent of 
higher levels of alcohol consumption is likely to be underestimated because on-sales could 
not be included and the allocation of consumption between individuals within the household 
cannot be considered. 
Household income was reported by household respondents in 7 bands of £10,000 
and an eighth band of over £70,000. Given that households were self-reporting their gross 
income, there was a potential for misallocation of actual income that was close to a threshold 
between bands. This was reduced by creating 3 groups for the analysis (low (below 
£20,000), intermediate (£20,000 - £49,000) and high (£50,000 and above)). When compared 
with gross household income deciles for 2010, the low income group corresponds to 
approximately the lowest third of UK household incomes (i.e. the cut off lies within the 4th 
decile) and the highest income group has a boundary within the 8th income decile therefore 
covering more than 20% of highest incomes. The median UK income is in the intermediate 
band. 
The Kantar dataset included a variable for household occupation with six categories. 
Five of the six categories refer to the type of occupation; a sixth group covers all non-
working categories (i.e. students, unemployed and pensioners). Given the potential wide 
disparities within this population, in terms of income, purchasing habits and preferences for 
alcohol, the sixth occupational class was not included in the regressions. However, the effect 
of the sixth occupational class on the results was explored, as described in section 4. The 
remaining five occupational classes were merged into 3 occupational groups (higher 
managerial and professional, intermediate, and routine and manual) which may capture 
purchasing trends not identifiable by income variables. Acorn (A Classification of 
Residential Neighbourhood) category was also included to consider any influence of 
residential area. The 56 Acorn categories in the Kantar dataset were collapsed into five 
categories (wealthy achievers, urban prosperity, comfortably off, moderate means and hard 
pressed) (Acorn, 2013). Age of the head of household and households with young children 
(i.e. children younger than 5 years old) were also included in the model. Alcohol 
consumption may vary with age and household composition. Family responsibilities might 
reduce alcohol consumption and hence purchasing. A promotion variable was included to 
control for the effect of any special offers or discounts on alcohol purchasing. Survey year 
was included to control for national trends that may influence aggregate purchasing levels.  
Other alcohol-related variables included in the analysis were average weekly alcohol 
expenditure (in pounds Sterling) and type of alcohol as provided by Kantar (beer or lager; 
cider; flavoured alcoholic beverages (FABs or alcopops); wine; other wines (sparkling and 
fortified wines); and spirits). Type of alcohol is a categorical variable, taking the value 1 if 
any of that type of alcohol was purchased, and 0 otherwise. The alcohol products cover all 
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the type of alcoholic drinks that can be purchased in Scotland. Zero purchase weeks was 
also included, i.e. the proportion of a household’s shopping weeks where no alcohol was 
purchased. It provides information on the effects of frequency on alcohol purchases. 
3 Methods 
The econometric model uses panel data in which observations of the same households are 
followed over a three-year period and there is more than one observed week of shopping 
per household. Besides, in the KWP data, socio-demographic variables are only recorded 
once in the last survey year (i.e. 2010). Hence, there is a possibility that a conventional 
approach using ordinary least squares (OLS) regression may produce biased estimates for 
time-invariant explanatory variables (i.e. household characteristics which are only recorded 
once for each household or which do not vary over time). The use of a fixed effects (FE) 
model to overcome this problem would imply that time-invariant explanatory variables (e.g. 
household income, occupation, gender, age, Acorn and alcohol purchase level among 
others) cannot be estimated.  
A Hausman-Taylor (HT) regression is a more flexible approach, and is the preferred 
model in this study. The HT estimator is an instrumental variable estimator that enables the 
coefficients of time-invariant explanatory variables in panel data to be estimated. It 
combines elements of both random effects (RE) and fixed effects (FE) estimations. HT 
assumes that some of the explanatory variables are correlated with the unobserved random 
individual-level effects: such explanatory variables are endogenous. It also assumes that 
none of the explanatory variables are correlated with the idiosyncratic errors: explanatory 
variables that are not correlated with either error terms are exogenous.  
HT model corrects for endogeneity of time-invariant explanatory variables by using 
individual means of strictly exogenous explanatory variables as instruments (Baltagi et al., 
2003, Cameron and Trivedi, 2009). Thus, the empirical application required the distinction 
between the explanatory variables which are uncorrelated with the unobserved random 
individual-specific effects (exogenous explanatory variables); and the explanatory variables 
which are potentially correlated with the unobserved random individual-specific effects 
(endogenous explanatory variables). The choice of strictly exogenous explanatory variables 
is a testable hypothesis. Failure to reject the null hypothesis (H0) of instrument validity 
implies the instruments are legitimate. The methods additionally distinguishes between 
time-varying and time-invariant explanatory variables. The HT equation is specified as 
follows: 
𝑦𝑦�𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝒙𝒙�1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖′ 𝜷𝜷1 + 𝒙𝒙�2𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖′ 𝜷𝜷2 + 𝒘𝒘�1𝑖𝑖′ 𝜸𝜸1 + 𝒘𝒘�2𝑖𝑖′ 𝜸𝜸2 + 𝛼𝛼�𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀?̃?𝑖𝑖𝑖 
x and w are explanatory variables; w denotes time-invariant explanatory variables,  x denotes 
time-varying explanatory variables; and 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 the idiosyncratic error term. 
Results from OLS and Tobit random effect (RE) regressions are also reported for 
comparison purposes. The latter model accounts for the panel structure of the data, but does 
not correct for the endogeneity of variables, since all variables are assumed to be 
uncorrelated with the unobserved individual-specific effect 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖  (Cameron and Trivedi, 
2009). Tobit RE regression also provides consistent estimates when the sample contains 
both positive and zero values for cheap alcohol purchased. In the Tobit RE model, the 
dependent variable can be considered as a latent variable for the demand for cheap alcohol 
units. Zero cheap units can be interpreted as a case where there may be demand for cheap 
alcohol but no purchase of cheap alcohol was made. A transformation was applied to the 
Tobit RE model, such that the dependent variable was expressed in its logarithm form. This 
enables the sampling distribution of the dependent variable to be corrected for skewness and 
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converge to normality (Cameron and Trivedi, 2009). To avoid any loss of the zero 
observations, we computed a formula such that values of zeros were very close to zero 
(Cameron and Trivedi 2009). In addition, Tobit RE model was used for post-estimations to 
obtain predicted probabilities and predicted purchased quantities. 
Sensitivity analyses included omitting variables potentially correlated with each 
other (income, occupation, Acorn categories) and alcohol products. The effect of missing 
income data for 541 households was also explored by comparing the distribution of alcohol 
purchase levels for households with and without income data; running the HT model 
excluding income on all households and comparing results with a sub-sample excluding 
households with missing income. 
4  Results 
4.1 Descriptive statistics 
Table 1 provides the basic descriptive statistics. These are presented for the whole sample 
and 3 subgroups of households: households who never purchased alcohol; households who 
purchased alcohol but never cheap, and households whose purchases included both cheap 
and non-cheap alcohol. Those who never purchased alcohol, and were dropped from the 
analysis, were more likely to be younger, female, have young children, and have lower 
incomes; which would be consistent with patterns of alcohol consumption. Table 1 also 
shows the descriptive for the sample used in the main estimation after allowing for missing 
values. Overall, the frequency distribution of the whole and estimation samples are 
relatively similar. There is a slight variation in frequency distribution amongst younger 
households (17>30), as well as income groups (low and intermediate) and occupation 
(intermediate, and routine and manual). 
Table 2 provides the statistics for alcohol-related variables of the whole sample and 
for the subgroups of households who purchased alcohol as in Table 1. The highest 
purchasing decile, decile 10, contains only households purchasing more than 14 units per 
person per week, whilst decile 9 contains households purchasing above and below this level. 
UK Chief Medical Officers’ current advice on low risk drinking recommends no more than 
14 units of alcohol per week, applied equally to men and women (Department of Health, 
2016). The relatively high percentage of weeks with zero purchases is an indicator of the 
potential of misclassifying infrequent purchasers as zero purchasers when observing shorter 
time periods. The average number of units and cheap units purchased per week by income 
group and survey year are also reported in Table 2. The weekly mean is provided both for 
all weeks observed (including weeks when households purchased groceries but no alcohol) 
and for only weeks where alcohol was purchased.  
The summary statistics in Table 2 indicate a positive and significant (p<0.000) 
income gradient for the mean units of all alcohol purchased, such that high-income 
households purchased the most units. Considering cheap alcohol, the gradient is also 
positive and significant (p<0.000) for the mean of cheap units including zero purchase 
weeks. However, the income gradient is negative and significant (p<0.000) when zero 
purchase weeks are excluded. This suggests a different purchasing pattern, such that low-
income households had more zero purchase weeks. The mean units purchased in each survey 
year decreased slightly from 2008 to 2010 for all alcohol and cheap alcohol alike.  
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4.2 Econometric analyses of cheap alcohol units purchased 
Table 3 presents the estimates of OLS, Tobit RE and Hausman-Taylor (HT) regressions. 
The HT specification is supported as the null hypothesis (H0=over-identifying restrictions 
are valid) failed to be rejected ( 𝑝𝑝 = 0.5714 > 0.05 ), indicating the validity of the 
instrumental variables. Comparison of the results with Tobit RE and OLS regressions 
illustrates how the ignoring panel structure and endogeneity result in overestimating the 
importance of certain explanatory variables.  
The relationship between cheap alcohol units and purchasing level in the HT model 
is positive and statistically significant for deciles 4 and above; households with the highest 
purchasing levels for all alcohol purchase the most units of cheap alcohol. Whilst low 
income is positive and significant in the OLS (1% level) and Tobit RE (10% level only) 
models, income is positive but not significant in the HT model. This change may be 
attributed to the potential effects of the panel structure and the endogeneity of alcohol 
products and expenditure, which are ignored by both OLS and Tobit RE models 
respectively. OLS tend to produce biased and inconsistent estimates of time-invariant 
variables when using a panel and in the presence of endogeneity in the model (Cameron and 
Trivedi, 2009). Results suggest that variation over same households and variation over time 
may have been better captured in the HT than in the OLS model, and that by ignoring the 
panel structure, OLS may have overestimated the importance of income variables, among 
others. Results from the HT indicate that routine and manual, and intermediate occupations 
purchase significantly more cheap alcohol compared to higher occupational groups.  
Apart from flavoured alcoholic beverages (FABs), purchases of all other alcohol 
types are significantly associated with an increase in cheap alcohol purchases when 
compared with the base category, wine. Alcohol expenditure, promotion, and zero purchase 
weeks are significantly and positively associated with the demand for cheap alcohol units. 
Survey year is statistically significant with fewer cheap units of alcohol purchased in 2009 
and 2010 respectively, as compared to 2008. Whilst Acorn categories, gender and age have 
some significant coefficients in the OLS and Tobit RE specifications, they are insignificant 
in the HT regression. 
Alternative models were estimated to ensure the robustness of our results1. Firstly, 
HT was run without ‘income’, ‘occupation’, ‘Acorn’, and ‘alcohol products’ respectively. 
In each of the 4 specifications, signs, magnitude and significance of the coefficients are 
mostly unaffected, compared to the preferred HT model. The exception is the specification 
without ‘occupation’, where low (β1=1.756) and intermediate (β2=1.348) income variables 
were positively and significantly associated with purchase of cheap alcohol units at the 5% 
and 10% levels, respectively.   
The last specification simultaneously excluded ‘occupation’ and ‘Acorn categories’, 
based on the assumption of collinearity between these variables and income; and potentially 
causing the low-level of significance of income variable. Overall, the results were also 
consistent with the preferred HT model. Noticeably, there was a change in the significance 
of income variables: low (β3=2.027) and intermediate (β4=1.540) incomes were positively 
and significantly associated with purchases of cheap alcohol units at the 5% level. This 
suggests that Acorn categories, occupation and income are potentially correlated. This is 
confirmed in the correlation matrix which revealed that most of these aforementioned 
variables are significantly correlated at the 1% level (p<0.000)2.  
Results of the HT model indicate that the effect of income on purchase of cheap 
alcohol units is more evident when occupation and Acorn are not controlled for. This may 
                                                 
1 Results not displayed but available on request from the authors. 
2 Results not displayed but available on request from the authors. 
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suggest that Acorn and occupation have diluted the effect of income or that the role of 
income has less importance once occupation and neighbourhood (Acorn) are accounted for. 
The non-significance of income may also be explained by the fact that there is usually little 
variation of income when considering occupation and neighbourhood: this implies that one 
would expect that on average low (high) income households tend to live in poorest (richest) 
neighbourhood and tend to belong to lowest (highest) occupational class. Finally, from an 
empirical perspective, it is also common for variables conveying the same type of 
information, such as social status or purchasing power, to act as a proxy for each other and 
provide more information separately, rather than jointly. 
Missing income data and excluded occupation  
Income data was missing for 20.3% of the households who purchased alcohol (541/2671).  
The percentage (21.8% ~ 38/174) was similar for those who never bought cheap alcohol and 
those who did buy cheap alcohol (20.1% ~ 503/2497). The distribution of alcohol purchase 
levels for households with and without missing income data was similar (Pearson chi2(9) = 
11.15; Pr = 0.265 (Table 4)). 
When HT estimation was run without the income variable, the results were similar 
in terms of signs, significance level and magnitude of coefficients. Restricting the estimation 
without the ‘income variable’ to households for which income data was available also 
produced similar findings. Results for households without income data differed only in 
having slightly more insignificant coefficients (occupation, 4th and 5th household alcohol 
deciles); the coefficients for household alcohol decile had the same level of significance and 
similar size compared to the preferred HT model. 
Additional sensitivity analyses investigated the effect of the sixth occupational class 
(unemployed, not economically active, pensioners and students) on cheap alcohol purchase. 
This variable represented 9% of households who purchased alcohol (237/2671). Firstly, we 
ran the HT model for this occupational class only; the second model included the sixth 
occupational class as an explanatory variable; whilst the last model controlled for all 
variables including the sixth occupational class amongst the observations. With the 
exception of household alcohol deciles 4 and 5 which were not significant in the first model 
(i.e. occupational class 6 only), other results were consistent such that coefficients’ signs, 
magnitude and significance were similar to the preferred HT model (results available on 
request). 
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Table 3:  OLS, Tobit RE and Hausman-Taylor (HT) regressions for units of cheap 
alcohol purchased 
  Weekly units of cheap alcohol 
Control variables OLS Tobit RE HT 
Household alcohol decile 2 (base: Household 
alcohol decile 1) 
-0.102*** 0.589*** 0.854 
[0.028] [0.083] [1.118] 
Household alcohol decile 3 -0.194*** 0.787*** 1.408 
  [0.042] [0.082] [1.145] 
Household alcohol decile 4 -0.026 1.042*** 2.485** 
  [0.057] [0.081] [1.196] 
Household alcohol decile 5 -0.269*** 1.101*** 3.144** 
  [0.077] [0.081] [1.278] 
Household alcohol decile 6 -0.317*** 1.230*** 4.094*** 
  [0.099] [0.082] [1.395] 
Household alcohol decile 7 -0.215 1.302*** 5.925*** 
  [0.133] [0.085] [1.642] 
Household alcohol decile 8 -0.273 1.254*** 7.430*** 
  [0.167] [0.091] [1.938] 
Household alcohol decile 9 0.374* 1.109*** 10.204*** 
  [0.224] [0.100] [2.390] 
Household alcohol decile 10 8.490*** 0.828*** 21.556*** 
  [0.339] [0.113] [3.032] 
Low income (base: High income) 1.421*** 0.095* 1.096 
  [0.120] [0.050] [0.867] 
Intermediate income 0.878*** 0.019 0.957 
  [0.113] [0.044] [0.756] 
Routine and manual (base: Higher and 
professional) 
1.476*** 0.028 1.949*** 
[0.087] [0.040] [0.663] 
Intermediate 1.050*** 0.078** 1.421** 
  [0.082] [0.038] [0.651] 
Beer and lager (base: Wine) 8.612*** 2.527*** 8.285*** 
  [0.314] [0.021] [0.152] 
Cider 11.480*** 2.647*** 7.647*** 
  [0.478] [0.034] [0.250] 
FABs -2.332** 1.977*** -2.712*** 
  [1.125] [0.079] [0.596] 
Other wines 8.397*** 2.693*** 4.990*** 
  [0.460] [0.030] [0.220] 
Spirits 14.321*** 3.055*** 12.431*** 
  [0.412] [0.025] [0.180] 
Alcohol expenditure 1.677*** 0.077*** 1.677*** 
  [0.032] [0.001] [0.004] 
Promotion 3.374*** 1.686*** 4.751*** 
  [0.377] [0.016] [0.115] 
Zero weeks (%) -0.017*** -0.030*** 0.149*** 
  [0.004] [0.001] [0.037] 
Robust standard errors in brackets. Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. 118,558 left-
censored observations. 42,589 uncensored observations. 
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Table 3:  OLS, Tobit RE and Hausman-Taylor (HT) regressions for units of cheap 
alcohol purchased (continued) 
  Weekly units of cheap alcohol 
Control variables OLS Tobit RE HT 
Year of purchase 2009 (base: 2008) -0.556*** -0.105*** -0.544*** 
  [0.080] [0.014] [0.072] 
Year of purchase 2010  -1.055*** -0.190*** -1.013*** 
  [0.073] [0.015] [0.076] 
Hard pressed (base: Wealthy achievers) 0.398*** -0.013 0.622 
  [0.076] [0.040] [0.677] 
Moderate means 0.894*** 0.043 0.753 
  [0.151] [0.052] [0.872] 
Comfortably off 0.961*** 0.076* 0.927 
  [0.091] [0.041] [0.694] 
Urban prosperity -0.611*** -0.062 -0.463 
  [0.119] [0.050] [0.855] 
Household with young children 0.033 -0.007 0.577 
  [0.091] [0.048] [0.790] 
Male (base: Female) 0.034 -0.033 0.200 
  [0.068] [0.029] [0.485] 
Age 30-40 (base: Less than 30) -0.183* 0.067 0.613 
  [0.106] [0.086] [1.480] 
Age 40-50 -0.201* 0.072 1.148 
  [0.109] [0.084] [1.440] 
Age 50-60 0.245* 0.072 1.853 
  [0.126] [0.086] [1.485] 
Age 60 and more -0.614*** 0.065 0.811 
  [0.110] [0.084] [1.435] 
Constant -0.016 -0.846*** -18.344*** 
  [0.409] [0.154] [4.004] 
Sigma u  0.492***  
   [0.011]  
Sigma e  1.520***  
    [0.006]   
Observations 161,147 161,147 161,147 
R-squared 0.751   
Rho   0.095  
H0: IV are valid (reject if p<0.05)     p=0.5714 
Robust standard errors in brackets. Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.118,558 left-censored 
observations. 42,589 uncensored observations. 
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Table 4:  Household frequency by average weekly alcohol purchase level 
Source: calculated by the authors – based on Kantar Worldpanel data (2008-2010) 
5 Discussion 
Results from all the econometric models show a strong association between households 
purchasing the greatest numbers of alcohol units per adult and cheap alcohol. Income is not 
significant in the preferred HT specification. Post-estimation predictions show that the 
probability of purchasing cheap alcohol increases with total alcohol purchased and is similar 
across all income groups. A similar pattern is seen for the predicted quantity of cheap 
alcohol; low income group is not the predominant purchaser of cheap alcohol in any 
purchasing decile (Figure 1 and Figure 2).  
 
Figure 1:  Average predicted probability of purchasing cheap alcohol units (<£0.50) 
within income and decile groups  
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Households with income 
data (N=2130) 
Households without 
income data 
(N=541) 
1 256   (9.58 %) 193   (9.06 %) 63 (11.65 %) 
2 262   (9.81 %) 208   (9.77 %) 54   (9.98 %) 
3 277 (10.37 %) 219 (10.28 %) 58 (10.72 %) 
4 260   (9.73 %) 201   (9.44 %) 59 (10.91 %) 
5 270 (10.11 %) 219 (10.28 %) 51   (9.43 %) 
6 280 (10.48 %) 214 (10.05 %) 66 (12.20 %) 
7 275 (10.30 %) 226 (10.61 %) 49   (9.06 %) 
8 264   (9.88 %) 219 (10.28 %) 45   (8.32 %) 
9 268 (10.03 %) 215 (10.09 %) 53   (9.80 %) 
10 259   (9.70 %) 216 (10.14 %) 43   (7.95 %) 
 Pearson chi2(9) =  11.15    Pr = 0.265 
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Figure 2:  Average predicted quantities of units of cheap alcohol (<£0.50) purchased 
per week per household within income and decile groups 
 
 
The findings with respect to higher level purchasers of alcohol are consistent with 
previous studies (Griffith and Leicester, 2010, Ludbrook et al., 2012, Holmes et al., 2014) 
in respect of purchasing more cheap alcohol and demonstrate that this relationship holds 
when considering purchasing over an extended period. This is important as cross-sectional 
data tends to overestimate zero purchasing (Leicester and Oldfield, 2009) and high levels of 
purchasing may overestimate consumption over a longer period.   
The findings of this study also align with other literature which suggests that alcohol 
consumption is predicted to reduce significantly for the heaviest consumers following the 
introduction of MUP (Purshouse et al., 2009). Whilst this clearly imposes a cost on them, 
in terms of loss of utility, hazardous and harmful drinkers are also predicted to benefit the 
most from the introduction of MUP in terms of reductions of alcohol related harms 
(Chalmers, 2014, Forsyth et al., 2014, Callinan et al., 2015). The proportionality of using 
MUP to address alcohol-related harms has been part of the policy debate and legal argument 
surrounding its introduction in Scotland. The legal argument has recently been determined 
in favour of its introduction (The Supreme Court, 2017).  
The data have also made it possible to explore indicators of social status other than 
income. In the HT model, income was not significant, and there was a social gradient with 
respect to occupation such that routine and manual occupations were associated with the 
highest demand for cheap alcohol. Removing occupation and neighbourhood (Acorn) 
variables increased the significance of income in the HT models, suggesting that income 
acts partly as a proxy for other measures of social status and not only as a measure of 
purchasing power. In other words, this suggests that low socioeconomic status is a 
significant factor in purchasing cheap alcohol. However, comparing the size of the 
coefficients, the effect of being in the highest purchasing decile has a far greater effect than 
social status. The post-estimation predictions from the Tobit model for quantity of cheap 
alcohol purchased (Figure 2) also indicate that differences only emerge in the highest 
purchase decile. 
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The additional variables available to characterise the alcohol market also offer some 
interesting insights. Purchasing items on promotion and having more zero weeks of alcohol 
purchase were both positively associated with demand for cheap alcohol in the HT model, 
suggesting a pattern of less frequent purchasing of greater quantities. Over a short period, 
this might indicate stockpiling, but the extended observation period examined here indicates 
an association with higher purchases of cheap alcohol overall. Preferences for different 
types of alcohol also have an effect. Compared with table wine, increased frequency of 
purchasing most other types of alcohol is associated with increased demand for cheap 
alcohol; the exception is FABs. These associations are plausible as wine has a higher 
average off-sales price per unit than other categories except for FABs (NHS Health 
Scotland, 2014a) and FABs account for around 5% of units sold below 50p (NHS Health 
Scotland, 2014b). 
This study has provided some important insights regarding the market for cheap 
alcohol. However, some limitations remain and require further research. KWP recruits 
households partly using census information on geographic area, life stage, household size, 
age and occupation to achieve national representativeness. Quality control and compliance 
are regularly monitored. Nevertheless the data has limitations. Alcohol purchases are among 
the most under-reported categories in KWP (Leicester and Oldfield 2009). This might 
reflect the method of recording purchases if not all items purchased are taken home and 
scanned. It may also be the case that such under-recording of alcohol is higher among 
households purchasing the highest levels of alcohol. Mean levels of purchasing reported and 
the downward trend between 2008 and 2010 are not replicated in aggregate sales data (NHS 
Health Scotland, 2014a). The under-reporting problem is common across consumer datasets 
and the main implication is that the extent of high levels of alcohol purchasing will be 
underestimated.  
There are potential limitations to the approach for identifying household purchase 
levels. First, the adults in a household may not have an equal share of the alcohol purchased. 
Secondly, the recommended levels are based on weekly consumption. The data used in this 
study related to purchases and not consumption. Whilst the analytical approach does attempt 
to control for this difference in timing by looking at the mean number of purchased units 
over time, it does not necessarily reflect the true alcohol consumption patterns. It also 
excludes consumption outside the house and so will underestimate the extent of higher 
levels of drinking. In relation to potential health effects, this analysis does not identify binge-
type consumption, where purchases are consumed over a relatively short period.  
The relatively large amount of missing income data was also a potential limitation. 
However, the issue of potential bias, which is frequently ignored, has been addressed and 
the missing data does not affect the results reported. The reporting by households of gross 
income within bands of £10,000 is also likely to involve a degree of approximation and a 
loss of information compared with more detailed collection methods but these might simply 
increase the level of missing data. The grouping of income into 3 categories (low, 
intermediate and high) reduces the extent to which households might be misallocated 
(through misreporting their income) as there are only 2 threshold points rather than 7. 
The results are an important contribution to the ongoing policy discussion of MUP 
as they use a longitudinal data set to confirm results relating to income and purchasing level 
which have been obtained from cross-sectional data. They show that a MUP policy would 
be well targeted towards the heaviest purchasers of alcohol. Other findings suggest that 
restrictions on alcohol promotions may also be worth exploring. Although legislation has 
already been implemented in Scotland to restrict volume based promotions (e.g. buy one get 
one free; 3 for £10), straightforward price reductions can still be used. These may induce a 
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pattern of less frequent purchasing of larger quantities and the results suggest that this may 
lead to a higher level of purchasing overall. 
The findings of this paper should be interpreted in the specific context of Scotland 
although the general principles underpinning MUP are likely to have wider application. The 
development of MUP was driven, in part, by increasing sales of cheap off-sales alcohol 
resulting from price competition between supermarkets, with some products being used as 
loss leaders to generate footfall.  However, the predicted effectiveness of MUP was also 
supported by economic evidence, including a study using Swedish data (Gruenewald et al., 
2006), indicating that this policy could reduce or avoid the ‘trading down’ to cheaper 
products that could reduce the effectiveness of tax increases. 
The findings here may be of interest to Nordic countries such as Finland and 
Denmark, which despite very restrictive alcohol legislation, state-controlled retailing of 
strong alcohol and high prices, have relatively high alcohol consumption levels compared 
to non-Nordic OECD countries (Ásgeirsdóttir and Gerdtham, 2016). Finland, in particular, 
has experienced price competition outside the regulated sector, including volume 
discounting; banning these resulted in price reductions for smaller packages rather than 
eliminating the volume discounts (WHO, 2013). The application of MUP outside the state 
regulated sector could provide a solution. 
Nordic countries could also review the operation of pricing within state monopolies 
to focus price increases on the lowest priced products. Canadian provinces also have state 
alcohol monopolies and can control alcohol prices in a similar manner to MUP.  Raising the 
minimum price level has been shown to reduce consumption and increase health benefits 
(Stockwell et al., 2012b). However, the relative ease of individuals bringing alcohol from 
neighbouring countries with lower prices may exacerbate excessive consumption 
(Ásgeirsdóttir and Gerdtham, 2016) and undermine efforts to control supply. 
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